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ABSTRACT 
No longer does Naval Surface Warfare merely entail 
battle between symmetric naval fleets conducted in large 
open water engagements.  Today’s Surface Warriors must have 
the training and capability to also fight asymmetric 
threats in congested locations of strategic value.  
Operations conducted within straits, choke points, and 
island cluttered littorals pose considerable risk and 
numerous challenges for today’s Navy.  Shore based anti-
ship missiles, torpedo and missile carrying small fast 
patrol boats, and mines present capable threats across 
naval warfare areas such as Anti-Surface Warfare and Mine 
Warfare.  In addition, conventional and midget submarines 
present an ever-growing threat within strategic littorals. 
Previous studies have generated high-end simulations 
to determine composition of blue force fleets, and 
suggested tactics for addressing various modern threats.  
This thesis compares how well off-the-shelf simulation 
software in the form of Larry Bond’s HARPOON3 Advanced 
Naval Warfare (H3 ANW) emulates high-end simulations 
validated through modified Hughes’ Salvo Equations. 
The results demonstrate the complexities involved in 
comparing the output of two completely different analytical 
tools. The mathematical nature of Hughes’ Salvo Equations 
provides a focused deterministic aspect; while the dynamic 
interaction of platforms, environments, and tactics 
designed into H3 ANW provide a completely different aspect 
with potential use as a learning tool for Surface Warriors. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
As the focus shifts away from high sea engagements, 
the U.S. Navy must deal with confrontations where tactics 
involving asymmetric warfare are becoming the norm.  The 
use of smaller, faster, easily mass produced vessels 
carrying heavier payloads in the form of surface-to-surface 
missiles (SSM) to attack larger opponents in key strategic 
near shore and confined waterways has forced the United 
States Navy to reevaluate its tactics. 
This thesis looks at littoral engagements between 
Friendly Forces (FRIFOR) and Opposition Forces (OPFOR) 
through the use of a commercial, off-the-shelf naval 
simulator that is readily available for public use; 
Harpoon3 Advanced Naval Warfare (H3 ANW) produced by Matrix 
Games. The goal was to determine how well the H3 ANW 
simulation software emulates high-end Operations Research 
methods, and discern whether it can provide valuable 
insight regarding operational concepts, tactics, battle 
space utilization, and the littoral threats faced by 
today’s United States Navy. 
Addressing previously tested scenarios, this thesis 
sought to reproduce results within a simulated environment 
and attempted to ascertain what insights can be gained by 
testing new approaches within these scenarios. Mission 
scenarios applicable to modern day real-world threats were 
developed using the Harpoon3 (H3 ANW) simulation software 




scenario outcomes between the simulation software results 
and similar results produced from the thesis work conducted 
by Ozdemir (2009). 
This study directly benefits decision makers 
interested in identifying and benefiting from a cost-
effective, readily available aggregated learning tool, with 
the potential to provide tactical insights into modern 
threats. The opportunity to simulate tactics and potential 
counters in challenging realistic scenarios such as 
littoral warfare can provide surface warriors a detailed 
learning environment. 
The key to the flexibility of H3 ANW is its database. 
Modular in design, it provides the information necessary to 
produce realistic models. Built upon the two original 
formulas developed by Larry Bond to first, determine a 
ship's damage point value based on the ship's tonnage with 
modifications allowing for ship type and construction 
methods; and second, determine the damage inflicted with a 
weapon system based on the warhead's weight. 
The scenario analyzed an encounter of Friendly Forces 
(FRIFOR) and Opposition Forces (OPFPR) in the Strait of 
Hormuz. However, its littoral environment is surrogate to 
strategic choke points throughout the world. The model’s 
outcome depicted littoral warfare operations in confined 
waterway where numerous islands and bays provide havens for 
small boat operations. These tactics have proven deadly for 
many conventional ships resulting in navies around the 
world adapting by adopting smaller, lighter, cheaper, and 
stealthier ships with greater capability to overcome 
asymmetric multi-axis threats. 
 xix
Five types of Iranian naval vessels were considered in 
this analysis, each capable of carrying surface-to-surface 
missiles or torpedoes. There were two classes of submarines 
carrying torpedoes, one conventional and one midget; two 
classes of missile carrying Fast Patrol Boats; and one 
class of Fast Missile Boat. Initially, the FRIFOR squadron 
was comprised of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). After that 
engagement was modeled, Russian Steregushchiy frigates 
replaced LCS in the model. The scenario results for each 
FRIFOR platform were compared and evaluated. 
The dynamics of real-world interactions within the 
model, environmental factors and geography affecting 
platform performance, provided great insight into 
considerations that must be addressed in combat operations. 
H3 ANW provided an excellent tool for experimenting with 
how these factors can affect a mission’s outcome. While 
difficult to design, creating or modifying platforms 
allowed the user to learn the strength and weaknesses of 
various platforms and weapon systems. The platforms 
designed in this model display very real threats the United 
States Navy faces within strategic choke points and 
littorals. The asymmetrical OPFOR threats present in the 
Strait of Hormuz were displayed, and used to demonstrate 
what FRIFOR tactics provided the greatest probability for 
mission success. 
H3 ANW produced a dynamic model demonstrating 
interactions between overlapping OPFOR patrol areas and 
weapon ranges. It allowed FRIFOR platforms to use specific 
tactics when engaging OPFRO threats.  It demonstrated that 
using dedicated anti-submarine warfare and anti-surface 
 xx
warfare defined missions and tactics marked a profound 
difference in the outcome of each run executed.  Whereas 
Salvo Equations provided insights through the use of 
mathematical calculations, and were instrumental in 
defining the scenario for this thesis; H3 ANW provided 
insights into specific platform capabilities and 
limitations, employed tactics, environmental factors, and 
geographic concerns when conducting operations within 
strategic choke points and littorals. 
The Harpoon3 Advance Naval Warfare series of naval 
simulations provides an inexpensive aggregated training 
tool that can benefit today’s United States Navy. It 
provides scenario based training that can be tailored to 
operations within specific geographical locations, 
demonstrate upcoming ship’s evolutions, or educate 
leadership on scenarios currently in the news headlines 
(e.g., Somali pirate interaction, United Nations Resolution 
enforcement).  The potential as a cost effective training 
tool to introduce surface warriors to the asymmetric 
threats they may face today has yet to be realized. 
 xxi
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 
The threats to today’s United States Navy have 
changed. More accurately, they have shifted in strategy and 
tactics, and not in such a way as to be in the United 
States’ favor.  With the fall of the Soviet Union, the 
potential for a blue water, high seas confrontation has 
been reduced.  While countries such as India, Russia, and 
China have navies capable of some projection of power 
beyond their immediate sphere of influence, their 
capabilities are limited in comparison to the strength and 
capabilities of the U. S. Navy.  Where they, and many 
countries, can take advantage of their capability is within 
littoral waters. 
As the focus shifts away from high sea engagements, 
the U.S. Navy must deal with new confrontations where 
tactics involving asymmetric warfare are becoming the norm.  
The use of smaller, faster, easily mass produced vessels 
carrying heavier payloads in the form of surface-to-surface 
missiles (SSM) to attack larger opponents in key strategic 
near shore and confined waterways has forced the United 
States Navy to reevaluate its tactics.  The threats posed 
by mini and conventional subs targeting high-density 
traffic in strategic choke points require dedicated 
resources to ensure safe transit.  
The United States Navy has developed the Littoral 
Combat Ship (LCS) specifically to operate within these 
regions, using tailored mission packages to counter 
potential threats. In coordination with larger naval forces 
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outside of the littoral, the LCS is designed to combat 
adversaries in challenging environments while supporting a 
Carrier Strike Group (CSG) or Expeditionary Strike Group 
(ESG) and protecting Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) 
(RAND Study, 2007; CRS Report, 2008), see Figure 1. 
A number of Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) theses 
have studied the challenges associated with littoral 
environments (Tiwari, 2008), how LCS compares to similar 
platforms in other navies when conducting operations in 
littoral environments (Christiansen, 2008; Ozdemir, 2009), 
and in what size and mission package diversity an LCS 
Surface Action Group (SAG) or squadron should operate 
(Abbott, 2008; Milliken, 2009).  To this end, traditional 
Operations Research (OR) methods have been used to conduct 
evaluations and analysis. 
In-depth calculations using Hughes’ Salvo Equations 
(Hughes, 1995) have provided analysis on survivability and 
cost effectiveness of LCS against relatively inexpensive 
asymmetric threats faced in strategic choke points such as 
the Strait of Hormuz.  High-end simulations, such as MANA 
(Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata), an agent-based 
distillation model commonly used by military operation 
analysts, have provided decision makers with visual 
representations in analyzing and determining LCS SAG 
operations (Abbott, 2008).  The purpose of this thesis is 
to look at similar engagements between Friendly Forces 
(FRIFOR) and Opposition Forces (OPFOR) using a commercial 




available for public use. Harpoon3 Advanced Naval Warfare 
(H3 ANW) produced by Matrix Games, has been selected as the 
simulator of choice. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Pictorial display of the concept for LCS 
operations (From Joint Requirements Oversight Council 2004)    




B. THESIS OBJECTIVE 
The goal of this thesis is to determine how well the 
off-the-shelf naval simulation software, Harpoon3 Advanced 
Naval Warfare (H3 ANW), emulates high-end Operations 
Research methods, and discern whether it can provide 
valuable insight regarding operational concepts, tactics, 
and battle space movement of surface combatants. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 How does the more economical, off-the-shelf 
simulation software compare to traditional 
Operations Research (OR) methods in accuracy, 
usefulness to the decision maker, and 
operability? 
 Can it be used to emulate the results of 
traditional OR techniques, such as Hughes’ Salvo 
Equations and provide an accurate simulation or 
visual representation of a defined scenario? 
 Can the simulations produced by the off-the-shelf 
software demonstrate or test potential tactical 
improvements for real-world scenarios? 
 Can recommendations such as tactical formations 
for missile combat be determined and displayed to 
decision makers? 
 Can simulation software be used to demonstrate 
in-depth defense strategy, emphasizing soft kill 
or stealth properties? 
 Can the simulation software produce a reliable 
scenario involving Opposing Force (OPFOR) 
submarines? 
D. SCOPE OF THESIS 
This thesis provides a comparison and contrast of 
affordable and readily accessible simulation software, and 
its ability to plan and provide tactical insights for the 
littoral threats faced by today’s United States Navy.  It 
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addresses previously tested real-world scenarios, and seeks 
to reproduce results within a simulated environment.  
Additionally, it is the goal of this thesis to see what 
insights can be gained by testing new tactical approaches 
within these given scenarios.   
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Mission scenarios applicable to modern day real-world 
threats are developed using the Harpoon3 (H3 ANW) 
simulation software Scenario Editor.  An analytical 
comparison is conducted on scenario outcomes between the 
simulation software and results produced from the thesis 
work conducted by LTjg Omur Ozdemir, (2009) Evaluation and 
Comparison of Freedom Class Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and 
Corvette-Frigates Around the World in Surface Action Group 
(SAG) Against Small Boat, Fast Patrol Boat (FPB) and 
Submarine Threats in Confined Waters.  The modified Hughes’ 
Salvo Equations used have been validated with the guidance 
of Professor Wayne P. Hughes, CAPT, USN (Ret.).  
F. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This study directly benefits decision makers 
interested in identifying and benefiting from a cost-
effective, readily available aggregated learning tool, with 
the potential to provide tactical insights into modern day 
threats.  The opportunity to simulate tactics and potential 
counters in challenging real-world scenarios such as 
littoral warfare can provide surface warriors with a safe 
and detailed learning environment. 
 6
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II. HUGHES’ MODIFIED SALVO EQUATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Basic Salvo Equations, developed by CAPT Wayne E. 
Hughes, USN (Ret.), deal with the representation of missile 
exchange between warships using surface-to-surface missiles 
(SSMs) and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) (Hughes, 1995). 
Building on the basic Salvo Equations, several theses have 
used modified versions of the Salvo Model to compare 
Friendly Forces (FRIFOR) and Opposing Forces (OPFOR) 
engagements.  Specifically, these models have been designed 
to represent a weapon exchange and defense encounter 
between homogenous forces (Hughes, 1995; Hughes, 2000).   
In the development of the scenarios used for this 
comparison, the OPFOR by design was heterogeneous, with 
values assigned to produce homogenized attributes.  The 
resulting homogenized attributes that appear in the 
formulas were validated by CAPT Hughes during discussions, 
and helped develop the engagement scenarios.  Additionally, 
Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) “leakers” were introduced 
into the modified Salvo Equations as an expansion on 
earlier work (Hughes, 2000). The detailed information on 
FRIFOR and OPFOR forces, the process in choosing their 
attributes, as well as the analysis and results, are 
covered in later chapters. 
B. MODIFIED SALVO EQUATIONS 
The modified force-on-force equations for combat 
engagements, achieved by a single weapon salvo fired by a 





( ' ' )A b B bB
b
           (1) 
 
where, 
A = number of ships in force A 
B = number of ships in force B 
B  = number of ships in force B out of action from A’s 
salvo 
4b  = Seduction Countermeasures Effectiveness 
1b  = number of hits by A’s missiles needed to put one B 
out of action 
 
'                (2) 
where, 
'  = fighting power in hits of an attacking A modified 
for scouting and training deficiencies and the effect 
of defender B’s distraction countermeasures 
effectiveness 
  = Scouting Effectiveness of A 
   = Training Effectiveness of A 
   = Distraction Countermeasures Effectiveness of side 
B 
   = number of well-aimed weapons fired by each A ship 
 
 
33 ' B Bb b            (3) 
where,  
3 'b  = hits denied to A by defender counterfire of B, 
degraded for defender alertness and training 
deficiencies 
 B  = Defensive Readiness/Alertness of B 
 B  = Training Effectiveness of B 
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' B B A              (5) 
 
33 ' A Aa a            (6) 
 
The corresponding terms and terminology hold for equations 
(4), (5), and (6), i.e., replace A with B ,   with   and 
vice versa(Christiansen, 2008; Ozdemir, 2009). 
 
C. DEFINITIONS OF MODEL PARAMETERS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Striking Power ( , ) 
 Striking power is the number of well-aimed offensive 
weapons fired by each ship in the Basic Salvo Equations 
designed for missile exchange. The scenarios analyzed in 
this thesis, however, require that the offensive weapons 
represented in the Modified Salvo Equations be short and 
long range SSMs and torpedoes. For each encounter and 
weapons exchange, it is assumed that both sides’ offensive 
weapons are within each others’ effective firing range. The 
number of well-aimed weapons is calculated using the number 
of ready-to-fire weapons on board, the Weapon Launch 
Reliability (WLR), and the Weapon Hit Probability (WHP). 
This, therefore, may result in a non-integer number 
represented by the equation  
Striking Power = Number of Weapons * WHP * WLR  (7) 
 10
The number of weapons is considered the number of 
ready-to-fire weapons, i.e., Harpoon long-range SSM 
canisters or the number of torpedo tubes on ships and 
submarines, and does not include a reload capability of the 
platforms. WLR is the probability that the fired weapon 
will leave its launcher successfully. WHP is the 
probability that the fired weapon will achieve a successful 
hit on its target, where the target’s defenses are not 
taken into account. 
For both forces and all ship and weapon types, the WLR 
is assumed 0.9. The WHP assumptions for the weapon types 
are as follows: 
 
Weapon Type WHP 
Torpedoes 0.9 
Short Range SSMs 0.8 
Long Range SSMs 0.7 
Table 1.   Offensive Weapon Hit Probabilities 
 
2. Defensive Power ( 3a , 3b ) 
Defensive power is the number of well-aimed weapons 
destroyed by each ship. Basic Salvo Equations factor in the 
SSMs and SAMs. In recent theses, defensive power has been 
investigated in depth, focusing on the types (Infrared 
(IR), active or semi-active radar homing) or lack of SAMs, 
number of Fire Control (FC) channels, as well as defense 
against torpedoes. Defensive power of a ship is different 
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for each type of offensive weapon. The parameter in the 
formula can be a non-integer number (Ozdemir, 2009). 
3. Staying Power ( 1a , 1b ) 
Staying power is the number of hits needed to put a 
ship out of action. In other words, this is the number of 
hits that can be absorbed before a ship’s Combat Power is 
reduced to zero. Combat Power is defined as striking power 
minus a target’s defensive power. A ship put out of action 
does not necessarily mean it is sunk; rather, it means it 
is either a neutralized threat or a firepower kill. The 
hits required to put a ship out of action linearly diminish 
her fighting strength. Staying power is dependent on the 
type of weapon (torpedo or missile) that hits, therefore 
the staying power of each ship is different against each 
type of weapon, and the parameter can be a non-integer 
number.  
4. Scouting Effectiveness (, B ) 
Scouting effectiveness is the degradation of striking 
power measured in hits per salvo. This degradation is due 
to imperfect detection or tracking of enemy targets. It can 
be described as the level of efficiency regarding the 
collection of enemy targeting information for a successful 
attack. The parameter takes a value between zero and one, 
one being 100% effective. A modern frigate with effective 
radars and organic air assets for scouting should have a 
targeting effectiveness of one. This can, however, degrade 
due to the target’s nature, e.g., small and hiding within 
clutter, such as other boats, land, etc.  
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5. Defensive Readiness ( A , B ) 
Defensive readiness is the extent to which a targeted 
ship fails to take defensive actions to her designed combat 
potential. This may be due to unpreparedness, lack of a 
condition of readiness, or reduced readiness caused by 
enemy Emission Control (EMCON). The parameter takes a value 
between zero and one, one being 100% ready. A good example 
of low readiness is when the Israeli Eilat Class Corvette, 
INS Hanit, was not 100% alert due to operational and 
intelligence relaxations at the time Hezbollah attacked 
with a truck-mounted C-802 during the Israel-Lebanon 
conflict in 2006. 
6. Training Effectiveness ( , B ) 
 Training effectiveness is the degree to which a firing 
or targeting ship does not reach her designed combat 
potential due to inadequate training, organization or 
motivation. The parameter takes a value between zero and 
one, one being 100% effective. This number could portray 
the level of professionalism of the crew, level of 
training, spare part and equipment technology constraints, 
etc. Scenarios can be developed using the assumption that 
OPFOR, such as the Iranian Navy, have a lower level of 
training effectiveness; if not due to professionalism, then 
certainly due to the number of obsolete ships in their 
fleet and the use of older equipment. 
7. Seduction Countermeasures Effectiveness ( 4a , 4b ) 
Seduction countermeasures effectiveness is defined as 
the level of success a targeted ship has in causing 
incoming weapons to miss. When an incoming weapon is homing 
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onto a ship, the seduction phenomenon diverts the weapon 
away from the ship. This can be accomplished by using soft 
kill methods, such as the deployment of a decoy or chaff. 
These methods are enhanced when working in conjunction with 
physical features of the ship to reduce Radar Cross Section 
(RCS). Seduction chaff or a decoy create a non-existing 
target for the weapon to home in on, and are doubtless the 
biggest contributors to this parameter. 
Seduction soft kill is a complementary element to 
conventional hard kill defense, i.e., SAMs. Other 
contributors may include stealth design, acoustic 
fingerprint or IR signature of the ship design, etc. 
Further, if combined with a seduction soft kill method such 
as creating a fake radar echo, a smaller RCS enhances the 
effectiveness of the soft kill method and increases the 
probability that a homing weapon will change course and 
engage the non-existent target. This parameter also takes a 
value between zero and one. This time however, one 
represents the worst case. This is due to the nature of the 
formulas. For example, a level of 0.85 would mean 15% of 
the incoming weapons would miss the ship due to seduction 
countermeasures effectiveness. 
8. Distraction Countermeasures Effectiveness ( A ,  ) 
Distraction countermeasures effectiveness is the 
ability for a defensive platform to cause enemy shots to 
miss before use of defensive power. The purpose of 
distraction is similar to the seduction phenomenon. The 
timing, however, is different. Distraction happens 
preferably before the enemy fires its weapons and prior to 
the lock-on from incoming weapons. Certain soft kill 
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methods create distraction. The attributes of the ship, 
however, also play a significant role.  
Distraction chaff or creating a fake radar echo, used 
during the enemy’s scouting phase or even after its missile 
is fired, may cause the enemy to target or the incoming 
missile to lock-on a fake radar echo. The ship design 
features mentioned in seduction countermeasures 
effectiveness contribute even more to distraction 
countermeasures. For example, having a smaller RCS in 
situations where the enemy is far away, may reduce the 
enemy’s scouting effectiveness. The enemy may not be able 
to see the ship on radar or, if a contact is present, it 
may be confused or “distracted” about which contact to fire 
at due to an insufficient radar echo. 
D. INTRODUCTION OF LEAKERS 
To better represent real-world scenarios, the 
introduction of leakers into the modified Salvo Equations 
was deemed necessary. The concept of leakers can be 
summarized as: no matter how effectively a ship’s crew 
trains and fights and regardless of the superiority of her 
personnel, sensors and weapons, there is an amount of 
considered leakage from the incoming enemy weapons that 
cannot be engaged by any means (Hughes, 2000). A case in 
point is an AEGIS cruiser or destroyer, which has excellent 
coverage of air space with the 3D SPY radar, is armed with 
numerous SM-2 SAMs, has the maximum capability to reduce 
the leakers from an incoming swarm of cruise missiles, but 
still cannot assuredly eliminate all incoming missiles all 
the time. 
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Note that even if one side has superiority over 
another with zero ships lost in the Basic Salvo Equations, 
there still will now be some loss due to leakers. In the 
modified Salvo Equations, additional losses due to leakers 
are calculated using formula (8). Leakage rate is the 
percentage of the incoming weapons that survive defensive 
counterfire. The resulting value, therefore, is typically a 
non-integer number. 
The number of losses due to leakers for side A adds to 
:  
Number of losses to Leakers = 
1
* *   B Leakage Rate
a
   (8) 
Leakage rate assumed for each weapon type is as 
follows: 
 
Weapon Type Leakage Rate 
Torpedoes 0.15 
Short Range SSMs 0.10 
Long Range SSMs 0.05 
Table 2.   Offensive Weapon Leakage Rates 
 
E. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
1. Fractional Exchange Ratio (FER) 
The primary Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) used in 
these calculations is the FER. It compares the fraction of 
the two forces destroyed by the other under the supposition 
that they exchange salvos. Mathematically, the ratio of 






           (9) 
 
FER indicates who wins the salvo exchange or if there 
is parity with losses on both sides due to leakers. When 
the FER is greater than one, side A has reduced side B by a 
greater fraction than side B has reduced side A. Thus, in a 
sense, side A has won because if things continue as is, it 
will have surviving units when side B is annihilated. When 
the FER is less than one, side B has the advantage of the 
exchange. If FER is between zero and one, side B wins, and, 
if FER is greater than one, side A wins. If FER is one, 
parity is achieved. The use of FER as a MOE is further 
discussed in later chapters.  
2. Remaining Units after a Salvo Exchange 
After a salvo exchange, the number of ships out of 
action is calculated from the modified Salvo Equations. 
Naturally, the number of ships put out of action has the 
lower bound of zero and the upper bound of the initial 
number of ships. Ships put out of action subtracted from 
the initial number of ships results in the remaining number 
of ships and is used as a secondary MOE. Thesis work 
conducted by LTJG Ozdemir looked into encounters and 
revealed the number of ships required to achieve a 
Breakpoint or Dominance. To achieve this, a fixed number of 
side B OPFOR ships was used against a variable number of 
side A FRIFOR ships; Breakpoint and Dominance are described 
as follows: 
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a.  Breakpoint 
Breakpoint for side A is achieved when the number 
of remaining A units is strictly greater than the number of 
remaining B units.  
b.  Dominance 
Dominance for side A is achieved when the number 
of A units lost is minimized and the number of remaining A 
units is strictly greater than the number of remaining B 
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III. HARPOON3 ADVANCE NAVAL WARFARE  
(H3 ANW) SIMULATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter provides detailed information on the 
development and use of the Harpoon simulation, originally 
created by Mr. Larry Bond. 
Harpoon is the name of a comprehensive series of naval 
warfare games developed initially in miniatures by Larry 
Bond in the late 1970s, and moved to computer format in the 
1980s. Computer Harpoon was derived from the paper rules 
for the original Harpoon miniatures game, which is played 
in a similar fashion to the popular role-playing game 
Dungeons & Dragons.  Focused on naval warfare, it was 
originally designed as an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 
training tool but eventually developed into all aspects of 
naval warfare.  
Using only unclassified sources available to him at 
the time, Jane's All the World's Ships and Combat Fleets of 
the World; and his academic background, a bachelor's degree 
in quantitative methods; Bond created the Harpoon game 
system using two simple formulas. The first determined a 
ship's damage point value based on the ship's tonnage with 
some modifications to allow for ship type and construction 
methods. The second determined the damage inflicted with a 
weapon system based on the warhead's weight. Harpoon was 
born, and in 1982, was awarded war gaming’s equivalent of 
the Academy Award, the H. G. Wells Award. It was during 
this time that Harpoon began to receive strong support from 
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the professional naval community and in 1984, Harpoon2 was 
published by Adventure Games (www.computerharpoon.com).  
In 1987, Larry Bond signed a contract with a Texas-
based firm, Applied Computing Services Inc., to begin 
programming the first Harpoon computer version. Thirty 
months in development, 12 man years of time, at a cost of 
over $300,000, the IBM DOS version of Computer Harpoon was 
published in 1989 by Three-Sixty Pacific Inc. Harpoon3 is a 
real-time naval war game at the tactical and operational 
level. It accurately models and simulates naval and air 
warfare with editable platforms, sensors, and weapons. 
As the successor to the award-winning Harpoon2 and 
Harpoon Classic, Harpoon3 Advanced Naval Warfare (H3 ANW) 
is quite possibly the most comprehensive, realistic and 
highly accurate strategy simulation of air and naval 
operations available to non-military users. The Computer 
Harpoon series is considered to be close enough to "the 
real thing" that it has recently been under development 
with the Australian Navy to be used as a training aid H3 
ANW uses Larry Bond's tabletop miniatures wargame Harpoon 
as its source. H3 ANW enables faithful modeling and 
representation of the full range of modern air and naval 
operations; including submarine & anti-submarine warfare, 
carrier battlegroup operations, convoy actions, land-based 
air operations, employment of nuclear weapons, amphibious 
and air-assault operations, massive fleet engagements and 
more. Additional features include: multiplayer support, 
third party databases, scenario editors, and more than 120 
pre-built scenarios to enhance the potential insights to be 
gained by its use. 
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B. EQUATIONS 
The key to the flexibility of H3 ANW is its database 
(DB). The DB is modular in design and provides the user 
with all the information necessary to make playing the game 
realistic. Figure 2 shows how vessels and aircraft are 
assigned Damage Points (DP) and Radar Cross Section (RCS) 
values based upon platform size. During scenario execution, 
these values are affected by a number of modifier values 
based upon variables such as: Target Noise modifier, 
Surface Gunnery modifiers, and even a Pilot Experience 
modifier. These modifiers, along with specific calculations 
for engagements, probability of hit, etc., provide the 
modified force-on-force equations for combat. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Platform Size Classification Table 
C. DEFINITIONS OF MODEL PARAMETERS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Striking Power 
Striking power is defined as the number of well-aimed 
offensive weapons fired by each ship in the Basic Salvo 
Equations designed for missile exchange. Unlike with the 
Modified Hughes’ Salvo Equations, H3 ANW has no assumptions 
that both sides’ are within each others’ effective firing 
range during each encounter and weapons exchange. As with 
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real-world engagements, the ability to hit an opponent is 
effected by a myriad of variables.  H3 ANW also takes into 
account calculations for the attack platform and weighs 
them against characteristics of the attacked platform.  
With Salvo Equations, the number of well-aimed weapons is 
calculated using the number of ready-to-fire weapons on 
board, the Weapon Launch Reliability (WLR), and the Weapon 
Hit Probability (WHP). H3 ANW uses the full scope of 
weapons available to the platform involved in the 
engagement, while tracking the probability that the weapons 




Figure 3.   Harpoon Damage Ratio Table 
 
One of Larry Bond’s original formulas while developing 
Harpoon was to determine the damage inflicted with a weapon 
system based on the warhead's weight. Building upon this 
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base formula, a series of modifiers and augmentations 
provide for the Striking Power in Harpoon.  Figure 4 
displays a general attack table. 
 
 
Figure 4.   General Attack Table 
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2. Defensive Power  
Defensive power is the number of well-aimed weapons 
destroyed by each ship. As stated previously, the defensive 
power of a ship is different against each type of offensive 
weapon.  H3 ANW takes this into consideration and has 
developed cross referenced tables for probability of hit by 
offensive weapons, modified by defensive characteristics of 
each platform given a particular weapon——specifically, a 
platform’s capability to shoot down an incoming missile. 
Figure 5 provides an example of one such table used for Air 
Defense Gun Hit Chance Modifiers. 
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3. Staying Power 
Staying power is the number of hits needed to put a 
ship out of action. Salvo Equations define this as the 
number of hits that can be absorbed before the Combat Power 
is reduced to zero, where Combat Power is defined as 
striking power minus the target’s defensive power. For H3 
ANW, this begins with the calculated damage points for each 
vessel as displayed in Figure 2, augmented by various 
modifiers to enhance or detract from this value. An example 
of one of these modifiers is seen in Figure 6.  
 
 
Figure 6.   Harpoon3 (ANW) Armor Effects Table 
 
It is important to remember that just as with the 
Salvo Equations, a ship put out of action does not 
necessarily mean it is sunk; rather, it means it is either 
a neutralized threat or a firepower kill. H3 ANW provides 
Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) either through preset 
conditions, or user interface. It also takes into 
consideration the ability for shipboard repairs made by 
onboard personnel.  Figure 7 displays some of the 
calculations used in affecting onboard repairs applicable 
to prolonged engagements. 
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Figure 7.   Breakdown Repair Table Showing  
Repair Times and Percentages 
 
The hits required to put a ship out of action linearly 
diminish her fighting strength. Staying power is dependent 
on the type of weapon, meaning the staying power of each 
ship is different against each type of weapon. 
Additionally, in real engagements, where a platform is hit 
is as important as with what.  H3 ANW provides for tracking 
critical hits or hits that cause greater damage based on 
proximity to vital locations, as seen in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Harpoon3 (ANW) Critical Hit Types Table 
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4. Scouting Effectiveness  
Scouting effectiveness is the degradation of striking 
power measured in hits per salvo, caused by imperfect 
detection or tracking of enemy targets. It can be described 
as the level of efficiency regarding the collection of 
enemy target information for a successful attack.  
 
 
Figure 9.   TMA Solution Quality Table 
 
In H3 ANW, as with Striking Power, several modifiers 
are used to affect the outcome of Scouting Effectiveness. 
These include equipment capabilities within specific 
environments as seen in Figure 9, visual line-of-sight 
(LOS) tables as displayed in Figure 10, and tables for 
various sensors affected by environmental factors, see 
Figure 11. Further degradation can be caused by the aspect 
and nature of the target, e.g., small and hiding within 
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clutter such as other boats, land, etc., with a platform 
aspect that reduces the RCS, see Figure 12. 
 
Figure 10.   Visual Line of Sight Table 
 
Figure 11.   Infrared Sensor Ranges 
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Figure 12.   Target Aspect Diagram 
 
5. Defensive Readiness  
Defensive readiness is the extent to which a target 
ship fails to take defensive actions up to her designed 
combat potential. This may be due to unpreparedness, lack 
of a condition of readiness, or reduced readiness caused by 
enemy Emission Control (EMCON) efforts. 
H3 ANW uses modifiers for Pilot Experience, but no 
similar modifier that pertains to surface or subsurface 
vessels. However, certain vessel and equipment 
characteristics do affect readiness in regards to EMCON. 
Figure 13 displays how H3 ANW tabulates Radar LOS, while 
Figure 14 shows the Low RCS modifier table. 
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Figure 13.   Radar Line of Sight Table 
 
 
Figure 14.   Low RCS Modifier Table 
 
6. Training Effectiveness  
 Training effectiveness is the degree to which a firing 
or targeting ship does not reach her designed combat 
potential due to inadequate training, organization, or 
motivation. Once again, H3 ANW does not have any built-in 
method of determining the training effectiveness of a 
vessel’s crew; but rather relies on the guidance and 
direction of the user interface. While many actions can be 
assigned to automated responses, the experience of the user 
allows for actions that enhance the probabilities for 
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detection, kill, etc. All of this in accordance with set 
parameters such as the Lost Contact Table in Figure 15.  
 
 
Figure 15.   Lost Contact Table 
 
7. Seduction Countermeasures Effectiveness 
Seduction countermeasures effectiveness is defined as 
the level of success in causing incoming weapons to miss. 
When an incoming weapon is homing onto a ship, the 
seduction phenomenon diverts the weapon away from the ship. 
Seduction soft kill is a major complementary element to 
conventional hard kill defense, i.e., SAMs. Furthermore, 
the effectiveness of seduction countermeasures is improved 
when the RCS of the targeted ship is reduced, increasing 
the probability that a homing weapon will change course and 
engage the non-existent target.  
Along with tabulated vessel characteristics, such as 
RCS (see Figure 14) and Armor Effects (see Figure 6), H3 
ANW also uses modifiers for such dynamic actions as seeker 
acquisition cones and the probability for a seeker lock-on 
(Figure 16), and the jammer effectiveness of a platform 
(Figure 17). Tracking the interaction of these tables 
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allows for a more complete and realistic combat engagement 
based upon modern real-world technology and tactics. 
 
 
Figure 16.   Seeker Acquisition Cones and  
Lock-on Chance Tables 
 
 




8. Distraction Countermeasures Effectiveness 
Distraction countermeasures effectiveness is the 
ability for a defensive platform to cause enemy shots to 
miss before employment of the defensive power. The purpose 
of distraction is similar to the seduction phenomenon; 
however, the timing is different. Distraction happens 
preferably before the enemy fires its weapons or prior to 
weapon lock-on. H3 ANW uses a combination of tables to 
coordinate how the characteristics of various platforms 
interact to provide distraction. 
D. INTRODUCTION OF LEAKERS 
Previous thesis work introduced leakers through 
modified Salvo Equations in order to better represent real 
scenarios.  H3 ANW, while not defining them as leakers, 
still allows for varying percentages of missiles to evade 
functioning defenses based upon the interaction of 
platform, weapons, and environmental effects.  
E. MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS 
The main Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) used in H3 ANW 
is the achievement of scenario specific Victory Conditions 
(VC). These conditions for victory can include achieving a 
percentage of enemy forces, instillations or platforms 
destroyed; reaching a specified navigation point 
(NAVPOINT); maintaining a specific percentage of friendly 
forces in operational condition; or a number of other user 
defined conditions. The scenario editor allows the designer 
to select what victory conditions are used in an 
engagement. The victory conditions designed for this thesis 
are complete destruction of all opponent platforms.  
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F. MODEL IMPLEMENTATION 
A scenario designed to emulate the thesis work of LTJG 
Ozdemir’s use of the embellished Salvo Equations Model has 
been designed in H3 ANW.  Variations on the execution and 
action of forces were used to compare outcomes between the 
collected Ozdemir (2009) data and the dynamic interactions 
of the detailed game data available in H3 ANW as displayed 
in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18.   Anti-ship Missile Attack Table 
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IV. SCENARIO PARTICIPANTS 
A. FRIENDLY FORCE SCENARIO 
The scenario for this thesis is an encounter of 
Friendly Forces (FRIFOR) and Opposition Forces (OPFPR) in 
the Strait of Hormuz. This littoral environment is a 
surrogate to many other regions, nations, and area of 
operations for non-state actors and military organizations 
around the world. The scenario’s outcome is to depict 
littoral warfare operations in a confined area consisting 
of numerous islands and bays that provide havens for small 
boat operations. These tactics have proven deadly for many 
conventional ships. Navies around the world are adapting to 
this environment and are adopting smaller, lighter, 
cheaper, and stealthier ships with greater capability to 
overcome these asymmetric multi-axis threats.  
As opposed to destroyers or cruisers, the LCS, with 
numerous air assets and lower heat and radar signatures, is 
considered a platform capable of providing an answer to 
these threats (CRS Report, 2008). Previous theses have 
analyzed whether or not LCS is the best design for this 
environment, or could another ship provide similar or 
better performance at less cost (Ozdemir, 2009)? This 
thesis uses the off-the-shelf simulation software Harpoon3 
Advanced Naval Warfare (H3 ANW) to emulate and enhance some 
of the results produced from a scenario that considered the 
LCS, and a similar Russian design, the RS Steregushchiy 
Class (Project 20380) Frigate. This scenario places a 
FRIFOR LCS squadron within the Strait of Hormuz in support 
of CSG-ESG operations in the Persian Gulf. Iran announces 
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the closure of the Strait to all commercial traffic in 
response to a perceived threat from Israel. Hostilities 
commence when the United States and allies challenge the 
closure. Concurrent allied operations have eliminated the 
Iranian Air Force, shore-based SSM, and mine threats. What 
remains at the scenario start is a robust Iranian littoral 
threat capable of devastating commercial traffic. 
Five types of Iranian naval vessels are considered, 
with each capable of carrying missiles or torpedoes. There 
are two classes of submarines that carry torpedoes, one 
conventional and one midget; two classes of missile 
carrying Fast Patrol Boats (FPBs); and one class of fast 
missile boat. With the exception of submarines, all OPFOR 
assets are very fast. Larger classes of ships are either 
obsolete or assumed to have been previously destroyed. Non-
missile or torpedo-carrying boats are not applicable to the 
analysis, since they present no lethal threat. 
FRIFOR ships are composed of an LCS Surface Action 
Group (SAG). To form a squadron level Task Force, the SAG 
will be reinforced by other LCSs. This Task Force will be 
positioned inside the Strait in the vicinity of the 
strategic Iranian naval bases. They will be ready to 
neutralize adversarial Iranian ships that are intent upon 
attacking traffic transiting through the Strait. The 
shipping lanes, however, are shifted further south, just 
off the territorial water lines of Oman and U.A.E. This is 
to reduce the attackers target acquisition range. FRIFOR 
ships operate inside a buffer zone between Iranian bases 
and the shipping lanes. 
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Initially, the FRIFOR squadron will be comprised of 
LCS only. After this engagement is modeled, the 
Steregushchiy Class frigates will replace the LCS in the 
model. The scenario results for each FRIFOR platform are 
then compared and evaluated. 
B. FRIENDLY FORCE CANDIDATES 
For model simplification, each LCS is assumed to use 
two MH-60R Seahawk helicopters, while Steregushchiy uses 
one KA-27 Helix helicopter; allowing the analysis to be 
focused on the ships and aircraft combination. Detailed 
information on FRIFOR platform designs has been compiled 
from the websites of Jane’s Fighting Ships (2009) and Naval 
Technology (2009) and is in Appendix A. Model Assumptions 
are in the next chapter. The following two tables represent 
general characteristics and weapon capabilities of the 
FRIFOR platform designs. It is assumed that all ships have 
organic ASW capabilities. 
 
Class Year Length Draft Weight Speed Crew 
Freedom 2008 115.3 m. 3.9 m. 3089 t. 45 Kts. 50 
Steregushchiy 2007 104.5 m. 3.7 m. 2200 t. 26 Kts. 100 
Table 3.   General Ship Design Characteristics 
 
Class SSM SAM PDMS Gun CIWS Torpedo 
Freedom - - 21 57 mm. - - 
Steregushchiy - - 8 100 mm. 4 8 
Table 4.   Ship Weapons Capabilities 
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1. Freedom Class LCS 
The first candidate for the Task Force is the USS 
Freedom. Since the tri-hull USS Independence has 
essentially the same capabilities as USS Freedom, it is not 
considered as a separate alternative. Freedom is a medium 
size frigate, with significant stealth features for 
littoral warfare operations. The main characteristics of 
the ship include tailored mission packages to be carried 
based on the required mission. Depending on the mission 
package, two organic aircraft embarkation schemes are 
available: two MH-60R Seahawk helicopters, or one MH-60R 
Seahawk and three MQ-8B Fire Scout UAVs.  
LCS has no onboard weapon systems and must rely on 
mission package component weapons for striking power; 
Seahawk helicopters carrying AGM-114 Hellfire missiles in 
ASUW role and Seahawk helicopters carrying Mk-54 torpedoes 
in ASW role. SAM capability is limited to RAM (Rolling 
Airframe Missile) Point Defense Missile System (PDMS).  
2. Steregushchiy Class Frigate (Russian LCS) 
Also known as the Russian LCS, Steregushchiy, although 
built for the same purpose, differs from the LCS in design 
and operational responsibilities. Built as part of the 
traditional Russian fleet, where every ship has a different 
specific duty, Steregushchiy is not quite as independent a 
player as LCS. For analytic purposes however, she is 
considered a candidate as a new ship with a goal towards 
littoral warfare operations. Steregushchiy lacks SSMs, but 
does have torpedo launchers as well as one Helix ASW 
helicopter.  
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C. OPPOSING FORCE THREAT ASSESSMENT AND ASSUMPTIONS 
According to worldwide intelligence centers, the navy 
is Iran’s most strategically important military service 
(Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, 2009). The Iranian 
navy is rebuilding and modernizing itself along with Iran’s 
other programs focusing on nuclear weapons and long-range 
ballistic missile building efforts. As most of Iran’s oil 
exports and trade pass through the Strait of Hormuz, the 
vital importance of the Persian Gulf is an obvious reason 
for its modernization efforts after the Iran-Iraq war 
(Ripley, 2008). Iran’s technology transfer from China, 
North Korea and Russia is well known. In addition, its 
indigenous shipbuilding efforts have, in recent years, 
proven fruitful (Fish, 2008; Gelfland, 2008).   
Along with Iran’s efforts towards building long-range 
ballistic missiles, anti-ship missiles based on Chinese 
technology pose a significant threat in the Persian Gulf. 
The Chinese C-802 missile is claimed to be a reverse-
engineered Exocet missile (Federation of American 
Scientists, 2009; Global Security.Org, 2009). They have 
been put into service as upgrades to their navy’s aged and 
unmaintained Harpoon missiles. The missiles have also been 
placed onto the new fast missile boats. Besides the C-802, 
short-range Chinese C-701 SSMs are also re-engineered in 
Iran. These are becoming the main assault weapons of the 
newly built fast (50 knots or over) and small boats (Jane’s 
Fighting Ships, 2009).  
The new Iranian small boats, with almost no RCS and 
very high speeds, pose a significant threat to FRIFOR 
operating close to Iranian shores. Although these boats do 
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not carry long-range SSMs, their local knowledge of the 
waters and high-speed capabilities give them the advantage 
to deliver their short-range SSMs. As mentioned, some of 
these boats are not missile-capable, but are torpedo-
capable. Although Iran’s capability to deliver a torpedo 
strike is uncertain, the effect of a torpedo hit due to its 
heavy warhead makes it a serious threat. The fact that some 
of these boats are semi-submersible increases the 
possibility of OPFOR boats approaching to closer distances 
undetected. It is important to note that this thesis does 
not model all of the forces briefed here, but tailors the 
OPFOR to specific platforms. 
1. Iranian Naval Force Review 
Table 5 outlines the Iranian Navy OPFOR surface and 
sub-surface capability. Large naval assets, such as 
frigates, corvettes, amphibious ships, auxiliary ships and 
other obsolete ships are excluded. Naval air assets and 
small inshore boats with no missile or torpedo capability 
are also excluded. It is an assumption either that the 
Iranian Navy’s obsolete assets will pose minimal threat or 
that the bigger ships will have already been taken out in 
previous operations or aircraft strikes. The remaining 
forces from the Iranian Navy include submarines and the 
smaller, newer and faster boats with lethal weapons. 
Iranian Caspian Fleet vessels are also not considered. 
After careful consideration of the strength of the Iranian 
Navy based on the latest intelligence from open sources, it 
is assumed that the Iranian Navy’s lethal combatant 
strength is within the following classes and numbers shown 
in Table 5. Detailed information regarding each class is 
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compiled from the websites of Jane’s Fighting Ships (2009), 
Federation of American Scientists (2009) and Global 
















3 x Kilo 10 x Kaman 10 x Mk 13 10 x Tir 
5 x Yono 10 x Thondor 5 x C-14 15 x Peykaap I 
  25 x Peykaap II 3 x Kajami 
   3 x Gahjae 
Table 5.   Iranian Naval Forces Strength 
 
2. Iranian Naval Bases 
Iran has numerous operational naval bases that control 
the entire Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of 
Oman. After careful consideration of the open source 
intelligence concerning Iranian naval bases, their 
locations, operational status, and Google Earth imagery, it 
is deduced that Iran has the operational naval bases shown 
in Table 6 (Jane’s World Navies, 2009; Jane’s Fighting 















Bandar Abbas* Bandar Lengeh* Qeshm Island* Larak Island* 
Bushehr Bandar 
Beheshti 




Kharg Island Sirri Island** 
  Khorramshahr  
Table 6.   Iranian Naval Bases  
* These naval bases are located inside the Strait of Hormuz 
** These naval bases are located just outside of the Strait 
 
Bandar Abbas is the largest and most strategically-
located naval base in Iran. It is on the mainland north of 
the Strait of Hormuz, approximately 30 NM from the shipping 
lane center. It is the headquarters of the Iranian Navy and 
responsible for the 1st Naval District. A major portion of 
Iranian shipbuilding facilities and dockyards are located 
here as well as many major naval assets. Kilo class 
submarines previously stationed here have recently moved to 
Bandar Beheshti for better access to open ocean. The second 
largest base is Bushehr. It is located on the mainland in 
the middle of the Persian Gulf and is responsible for the 
2nd Naval District. 
Another large base is Bandar Lengeh, which controls 
the Persian Gulf entrance of the Strait. Previously 
mentioned, Bandar Beheshti is the newly designated 
submarine base in the Gulf of Oman. Bandar Khomeini is 
located in the oil-rich Basra region. 
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Of the medium sized bases, the most important is Qeshm 
Island, which is strategically located inside the Strait of 
Hormuz. It is an island practically connected to the 
mainland forming an extension deep into the Strait. Jask is 
the newest naval base on the Gulf of Oman entrance to the 
Strait and it is built to better control shipping lanes. 
Kharg Island is an island base located in a major offshore 
oil region in the central Persian Gulf. Lastly, 
Khorramshahr, located in the Basra region, is located on 
the border of Iraq. 
The three small island bases are typical piers 
designed to support small naval assets. Larak Island is in 
the Strait’s heart and Abu Musa Island, although disputed 
by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), is in the western 
entrance to the Strait. Sirri Island is just outside the 
Strait and further west than the previous two islands. 
3. Iranian Naval Base Asset Allocation 
Considering the Iranian oil drilling and processing 
sites, major trade routes, geopolitically important 
strategic locations, such as the Strait of Hormuz, the 
ongoing United States and coalition exercises and 
operations in and outside of the Persian Gulf, it is 
assumed that the strength of the Iranian Navy is 
distributed as depicted in Table 7. This assumption is made 
regarding current locations of the Iranian Naval assets, 
excluding the Caspian Fleet, and has been investigated 
using open source intelligence. This assumption is for 
analytical purposes only. 
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Naval Base Submarines PGFG PTG PTF 
Bandar Abbas 2xKilo 
3xYono 
6xKaman 2xPeykaap II  
Bushehr 2xYono 4xKaman 2xPeykaap II  
Bandar 
Lengeh 










 2xThondor 2xMk 13 
2xPeykaap II 
 





Jask   2xMk 13 
2xPeykaap II 
2xPeykaap I 




Khorramshahr   2xPeykaap II 2xPeykaap I 









Sirri Island   2xPeykaap II 2xTir 
2xPeykaap I 
2xGahjae 
Table 7.   Iranian Naval Base Asset Allocation  
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D. OPPOSING FORCE SCENARIO 
In this section, the OPFOR operational plans and 
FRIFOR Scenario merge and create the modeled scenario. 
There are a total of seven Iranian bases in and around the 
Strait of Hormuz. (See Figure 19) The total number of 
assets allocated to these bases is 33 vessels. 
 
 
Figure 19.   Strait of Hormuz and Vicinity, after Microsoft 
Encarta (Best Viewed in Color) 
 
To focus the scenario and the model into a higher 
resolution geographic area, four bases, Sirri Island, Abu 
Masu Island, Larak Island and Jask, have been omitted from 
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the OPFOR scenario. This is due to the types of platforms 
available and the objective of modeling the scenario with 
Harpoon3 (ANW). As a result, only three bases (Bandar 
Abbas, Qeshm Island, and Bandar Lengeh) with a total number 
of 20 allocated assets are considered. The first two bases 
are located in the central Strait; the third is on the west 
side, as depicted in Figure 20. Additionally, the Pakkaap, 
Mk-13, and PTF platforms were removed from the model in 
order to provide a focused OPFOR within the H3 ANW model. 
 
 
Figure 20.   Scenario Naval Bases in Strait of Hormuz,  
after Microsoft Encarta (Best Viewed in Color) 
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Considering base locations, Iranian Naval Forces are 
divided into two groups and threat to FRIFOR is expected 
from two different axes: the Central Strait area with two 
bases (13 Iranian naval assets) and the Western Strait area 
with one base (seven assets). Considering the geographical 
separation, simultaneous engagements are assumed to occur 
in two different places. The FRIFOR Squadron is also 
divided into two groups. This allows for an encounter with 
two OPFOR groups consisting of the Iranian assets listed in 
Table 8.  
The engagements are to take place in the following 
order. The first attackers from Iranian bases will be the 
Kilo submarines. When hostilities start, the Kilo Class 
submarines are expected to be in central part of the Strait 
ready to sink any tanker, merchant, or enemy naval vessel 
within weapon range. The second wave of attackers are the 
FPBs with C-802 long-range SSMs.  
The third wave is the Yono Class midget submarines. 
Because of their small size and shore support dependence, 
they are not expected in open seas, but do pose a threat in 
the Strait. The final attacker wave contains the PTGs with 
short range SSMs restricted to the near shore zone.  
 
Naval Base Submarines PGFG PTG 





 4xThondor 3xC-14 
 
Qeshm Island   2xC-14 
Table 8.   Iranian Naval Base Asset Allocation for Scenario 
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Summarizing, there are two engagement regions and a 
total of four waves of attackers. Referencing the thesis 
work of LTJG Ozdemir, the Salvo Model reveals the number of 
FRIFOR ships needed for Breakpoint and Dominance for each 
encounter given the number of OPFOR. Therefore, FRIFOR is 
divided into two squadrons and the force sizes become model 
variables. The OPFOR is assumed to be structured into the 
following Task Force (TF) and Task Groups (TG). TF 480, 
composed of four TGs and a total of 13 vessels, operates 
out of Bandar Abbas and Qeshm Island. TF 490, composed of 2 
TGs and a total of 7 ships, operates out of Bandar Lengeh, 
see Table 9. 
 
 
TF 480 Units TF 490 Units 
TG 480.01 SSK 
2 X Kilo 
TG 490.01 PGFG 
4 x Thondor 
TG 480.02 PGFG 
6 x Kaman 
TG 490.02 PTG 
3 x C-14 
 
TG 480.03 SSC 
3 x Yono 
  
TG 480.04 PTG 
2 x C-14 
 
  
Table 9.   OPFOR Order of Battle  
 
E. OPPOSING FORCE ASSETS 
Detailed information on each class of OPFOR platform 
and their weapons capability is in Appendix B.  
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1. Kilo (Project 877 EKM) Class Submarine (SSK) 
The Iranian Navy has three Russian-built Kilo-class 
conventional submarines. Although it is reported that these 
submarines underwent major refit under Russia’s 
supervision, including the addition of Russian ASCMs, this 
update is not confirmed and was not modeled. (Jane’s 
Underwater Warfare Systems, 2009) A typical diesel 
submarine, Kilo-class carries 18 heavyweight (533 mm) 
torpedoes. The submarines’ mine-laying capability is not 
considered in the model. Reports of their transfer to a 
base in the Gulf of Oman have been confirmed, but for the 
sake of this analysis, two Kilo class boats operate out of 
Bandar Abbas, as previously stated.  
2. Yono (IS 120) Class Coastal Submarine (SSC) 
Based on North Korean midget submarine technology, the 
recently built five Yono class boats are very small and 
shore-support dependent. They are designed for littoral 
waters, and can deliver at least two torpedoes. They are 
considered to be built as covert weapons to strike vessels 
in the Strait of Hormuz (Jane’s Underwater Warfare Systems, 
2009). Three Yono class subs are used in this scenario. 
3. Kaman (Combattante II) Class FPB (PGFG) 
Built in late 1970s and early 1980s in France and 
recently in Iran, these 13 ships are the primary missile 
force within the Iranian Navy for territorial water 
defense. Having had their weapons upgraded to four C-802s, 
they pose a serious threat to any vessel operating in or 
around the Strait of Hormuz. Six Kaman class FPBs are used 
in this scenario. 
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4. Thondor (Houdong) Class FPB (PGFG) 
Ten Thondor class FPBs were built by China in 1990s 
and, along with Kaman class FPBs, form the long-range SSM 
capable force of the Iranian Navy. Armed with four C-802s, 
they are another formidable threat facing FRIFOR. Four 
Kaman class FPBs are used in this scenario. 
5. C-14 Class Patrol Boat (PTG) 
Chinese built, C-14s carry four C-701 short-range 
anti-ship missiles, based on Chinese FL-10 technology, and 
are designed for coastal defense. Nine were delivered in 
the early 2000s; five missile-capable and the rest designed 
as inshore craft. PTGs have speeds of 50 knots or over, 
weight of 30 tons or less and length of 21 meters. Five 
missile-capable C-14 class PTGs are used in this scenario. 
 
 53
V. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
A. FRIENDLY FORCE MODEL ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
This section outlines the assumptions and limitations 
of the FRIFOR platforms considered in the model. To 
determine model parameters, certain assumptions had to be 
made to allow for ship capability comparisons. The 
helicopters used by the LCS platform are MH-60R Seahawks, 
with either an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) weapons loadout 
of two Mk-54 torpedoes or an anti-surface warfare (ASUW) 
weapons loadout of eight Hellfire missiles. Due to their 
limited size, capacity, and smaller flight deck, 
Steregushchiy platforms carry the lighter weight KA-27 
Helix with an ASW loadout of one torpedo. Against PGFGs and 
PTGs, helicopter-launched Hellfires are used as the primary 
means of engagement. It is assumed that using Harpoon-like 
ship-launched long-range SSMs against small boats is not 
reasonable due to cost and target-allocation schemes. 
For Salvo Equation modeling purposes, the Hellfire 
missiles fired from FRIFOR helicopters and the C-701s fired 
from PTGs are considered equivalent weapons. Similarly, the 
FRIFOR long-range SSMs (Harpoon, Exocet or RBS) are 
considered to be equivalent with Iranian C-802s. In the 
ship versus submarine encounters all the torpedoes (ship, 
helicopter or submarine-launched) are also considered 
equivalent. Harpoon3 Advanced Naval Warfare (H3 ANW) 
however, has the ability to keep track of each weapon type 
and its probability of success under varying environmental 
and combat conditions.  Given this capability, the previous 
Salvo Equation assumption of homogeneity was not required. 
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During encounters, the offensive weapons used by the 
opposing sides are not necessarily of the same equivalency. 
For example, LCS platforms use helicopter-launched 
Hellfires as their primary weapon against all enemy surface 
ships; however, the PGFGs and PTGs return fire on LCS with 
C-802s and C-701s respectively. Additionally, H3 ANW also 
allows combat interactions with large caliber guns, 
ultimately the biggest threat to helicopters.  
For Hughes’ Salvo Equation modeling purposes, the LCS 
unique mission package concept is not fully recognized. 
Against Iranian submarines, LCS has the ASW mission package 
employed, specifically two helicopters. When the threat 
changes to surface combatants, an ASUW mission package is 
employed, with either two helicopters or one helicopter and 
UAVs, depending on the threat, PTG or PGFG respectively. 
This transition is assumed to occur successfully after an 
encounter and between waves of OPFOR attackers. During the 
encounters where helicopters are employed, they are assumed 
in the air before the salvo exchange commences and refueled 
after each encounter. Also after each encounter, the ship 
and helicopter weapons are reloaded. 
For H3 ANW modeling, again the specific tailored 
packages are not employed.  Rather, a mix of capabilities 
are used to develop a more realistic scenario.  Weapon 
loadouts for helicopters are tailored to the expected 
threat, explained in the greater detail below. Helicopters 
are designed to be ready to launch as soon as the platform 
approaches the threat zone or upon receiving indications 
and warning (IW). Additionally, when developing the 
scenario, the Editor displays a 1/3 Rule check box. When 
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this is selected (default setting), H3 ANW will keep one-
third of the assigned aircraft in the air. This applies to 
area missions only. If the 1/3 Rule check box is not 
selected, all of the aircraft assigned to the area mission 
are launched. The model then operates all platforms 
according to their individual characteristics as various 
modifiers apply.  The model for this thesis used the 1/3 
Rule to operate the scenario as close to a real-world 
platform as possible, controlling the launch and 
coordination of helicopter assets while keeping some in a 
ready status for emergent tasking. Fuel consumption during 
search patterns and weapon usage during engagements 
determine helicopter landing, refueling, and rearming 
requirements as opposed to between each wave of attackers 
as with the Salvo Equation model.  
The successive wave of attackers concept worked well 
for calculations in the Salvo Equation model; however, it 
was not successfully employed in the H3 ANW model.  Despite 
attempts to model OPFOR assets within their expected 
capabilities and range limits, their physical proximity 
within the Strait of Hormuz meant that many of their 
designed patrol zones overlapped as did many of their 
weapon range capabilities.  This was not unexpected, and is 
believed to have produced a more realistic scenario, albeit 
not one conducive to making direct comparisons between the 
outcomes of the Salvo Equation model and the H3 ANW model. 
1. Freedom Class LCS 
In the Salvo Equation model, LCS engagements use two 
helicopters along with UAVs for scouting, but only 
helicopters are used for weapon-delivery. LCS has no ship-
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born striking power (SSMs or torpedoes). LCS operates two 
helicopters for ASW with a striking power of four torpedoes 
or two helicopters for ASUW, against PTGs with a striking 
power of 16 Hellfires. Against the PGFGs, it is assumed 
that LCS should operate only one helicopter with striking 
power of 8 Hellfires. LCS defensive power is nine against 
the SSMs. This is based upon a sum of 21 cell RAM launcher 
and a capable rapid-firing 57 mm gun. Staying power against 
lightweight torpedoes and long-range SSMs is 1.9 and short-
range SSMs is 2.9 due to differences in warhead sizes. More 
extensive staying and defensive power explanations of 
FRIFOR ships are in Appendix C of Ozdemir (2009). 
In the H3 ANW model, the two MH-60s for each platform 
are armed according to intelligence regarding expected 
OPFOR capability. TF01, which approaches from the East into 
the Strait of Hormuz, is given IW that the Iranian Kilo 
subs are stalking targets near the mouth of the strait, 
while the Yono midget subs are limited in endurance and are 
in closer proximity to shore support from the base at 
Qeshm. This allows each LCS platform in TF01 to employ one 
MH-60R for ASW prosecution and one MH-60R in an ASUW patrol 
mission. This tasking was not consistent with LCS initial 
module loadout, but demonstrates how H3 ANW can be used to 
test and learn from new tactics.  
The LCS platforms assigned to TF02 approach the Strait 
from the West, and have IW that a number of fast patrol 
boats (FPBs) and missile boats (PTGs) operate in the 




from each platform are outfitted with eight Hellfire 
missiles in preparation for their ASUW patrols and 
engagements.  
2. Steregushchiy Class Frigate 
In LTJG Ozdemir’s Salvo Equation model, Steregushchiy, 
like LCS, had no SSMs on board, making the only offensive 
missile the air-launched Hellfire with a striking power of 
eight. ASW role striking power is 12 torpedoes, which is a 
sum of eight tubes on the ship and four torpedoes on the 
helicopter. Defensive power is 7.7 against a SSM firing 
enemy, composed of four 30 mm CIWS, eight short-range IR 
SAMs, and a 100 mm gun. The staying power against 
lightweight torpedoes and long range SSMs is 1.6 and short 
range SSMs is 2.5. 
In the H3 ANW model, Steregushchiy is almost a 
completely different platform. The capabilities of the 
platform are designed under a Harpoon database (DB) written 
and developed by a collection of individuals from the HUD3 
– Harpoon 3 ANW Database website.  The Harpoon Users' 
Database series (HUD), grew out of the initial on-line 
community attempts to make corrections to previously 
released databases and is regarded as one of the best 
sources for online scenarios and DBs. The Steregushchiy was 
only available on the HUD3 DB.  For this model, attempts to 
copy the platform specifics from the HUD3 DB into the H3 
ANW DB proved impossible.  As a result, the author 
attempted to design a platform with the same 
characteristics. The depth and detail of information in H3 
ANW platform design was driven home. The resulting 
platform, has all of the capabilities and characteristics 
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of the original HUD3 DB design, but is considerably 
different from the platform used in the Salvo Equation 
model. Most notably is the use of the KA-27 Helix verses 
the MH-60R Seahawk for helicopter operations. 
B. OPPOSING FORCE MODEL ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
As mentioned, OPFOR was designed in the form of two 
TFs (See Figure 21); approaching as four waves of attackers 
for the Salvo Equation model, and a single complete force 
for the H3 ANW model. In TF 480, there are two PTGs forming 
TG 480.4 and six PGFGs forming TG 480.2. Two classes of 
submarines totaling five vessels, are broken up with two 
Kilos forming TG 480.1 and three Yonos forming TG 480.3. 
The major threat from TF 480 comes in the heart of the 
Strait. This is due to the concentration of submarines and 
the large number of overlapping missile ranges from the 
other vessels.  
TF 490 operations in the western part of the Strait 
are bound to the Bandar Lengeh base and more limited in 
scope. These operations are modeled to attack in two waves 
under the Salvo Equations model. TG 490.01 consisting of 
four Thondor class PGFGs comprise the first wave while TG 
490.02 with three PTGS forms the second. Once again, in the 
H3 ANW model, there is no distinction between the waves of 
attackers despite limitations placed on the range of patrol 
operations. The purpose of this TF is to swarm the FRIFOR 
ships, saturating their defenses and creating an opening to 
attack tankers or other merchant vessels being screened. 
Since this combined TF included PGFGs and PTGs, their 
striking power (C-802s and C-701s), defensive power (large 
caliber guns on Thondor classes), and staying powers were 
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homogenized in the Salvo Equations model. Detailed 
calculations are shown in Appendix C of Ozdemir (2009).  
The following information describes the assumptions 
and limitations of each attacker within TF 480 and TF 490. 
 
 
Figure 21.   OPFOR Within Strait of Hormuz with Weapon Ranges 
Displayed (Best Viewed in Color) 
 
1. TG 480.01: Kilo Class SSK 
Both Kilo submarines allocated from Bandar Abbas are 
involved in the initial wave. The submarine has six 
torpedo-launching tubes and given a striking power of six, 
while defensive and staying power were both one in the 
Salvo Equation model. Based upon their stealth capability, 
it was expected that the submarine threat would need to be 
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eliminated by conventional ASW forces before littoral 
operations began. Salvo Equations vividly showed the 
dominance of the submarines in ship versus submarine 
encounters. It showed that very few numbers of submarines 
can pose a serious threat and a large number of ships are 
required to dominate the encounter (Ozdemir, 2009). 
The H3 ANW model initially displayed the same results. 
One or two Kilos would destroy any surface platform that 
came within range, usually without being detected.  Once 
the LCS platform was specifically assigned to the ASW 
mission and configured to use an MH-60R in an ASW capacity, 
the Kilos were systematically prosecuted and destroyed. The 
key was defining the ASW mission.  Once engaged in this 
manner, the LCS platforms used the tactic of staying 
outside of the sub threat zone and directing the MH-60Rs to 
conduct search and detection followed by prosecution.  The 
Steregushchiy platform performed well also, again once 
specifically assigned to an ASW mission. Until the ASW 
mission was entered as the mission for these platforms; 
however, they tended to move right into weapons envelopes 
of the Kilos. 
2. TG 480.02: Kaman Class PGFG 
Also operating from Bandar Abbas, six ships are used 
in this model. Since they have the long-range SSMs, they 
are the second encounter in the Salvo Equations. Striking 
power is designated as four C-802 long-range SSMs. Limited 
to a single 76 mm gun, defensive power is only two. Staying 
power is one against long range SSMs and 1.5 against 
Hellfires. 
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In H3 ANW a visual representation of these platforms 
in the environment quickly made it obvious that the range 
of the C-802s would overlap the operating sectors for some 
of the other OPFOR assets.  In fact, their range covers a 
significant portion of the region, which serves to 
highlight the inherent danger of conducting operations 
within such a strategic choke point and confined waterway. 
3. TG 480.03: Yono Class SSC 
All three of these midget submarines were expected out 
of Bandar Abbas. After the initial two waves of attackers, 
FRIFOR ships move towards the Iranian mainland, where the 
Yono class subs pose the third threat. Assumed to be 
carrying two torpedoes, the striking power is two, the 
defensive power and staying power was one, the same as a 
Kilo submarine in the Salvo Equation model. 
In the H3 ANW model, this platform does not exist. It 
is one of the platforms specifically user designed for the 
model.  The three created platforms operated as expected 
and provided a capable threat against surface platforms. 
Their area of operation was limited with the Yono’s 
dependence on shore support taken into account. As with the 
Kilos, they pose a credible threat against the surface 
forces until the surface platform and their air assets are 
tasked with ASW missions. 
4. TG 480.04: C-14 PTGs 
As the fourth wave of attackers, a total of two PTGs 
operated out of Qeshm Island. Their striking power of 2.8 
comes from their loadout of C-701s. Their defensive and 
staying power are both one. 
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The H3 ANW database has a version of this platform 
available, but it is incomplete. Modifying its 
characteristics and weapon loadout was accomplished through 
the use of the Database Editor. Designed to operate closer 
to shore than the Kamans or Thondors, the C-14s provide a 
small, fast, and capable platform that covers a large 
portion of the choke point. 
5. TG 490.01: Thondor Class PGFGs 
The first attack wave in the western region is the 
combination of the four available Thondor class ships from 
Bandar Lengeh. The Striking power of the class is four C-
802s. Due to rapid firing medium caliber guns, Thondor’s 
defensive power is two, and staying power was 1.2.  
A similar platform was used from the H3 ANW database 
as the guideline for developing this platform. Using the 
platform information from Jane’s, the Thondor was added to 
the library with the strike capability of C-802s. As with 
the Kaman class, these vessels are fast, have greater range 
to conduct operations, and can target and destroy FRIFOR 
surface combatants at a much greater range.  Again, the C-
802s provided the ability to cover a large percentage of 
the region. For this thesis scenario, four of these PGFGs 
patrol the western entrance to the Strait of Hormuz. 
6. TG 490.02: C-14 PTGs 
The second attack wave in the western region was the 
three C-14 PTGs out of Bandar Lengeh. Just as with TG 
480.4, the striking power of 2.8 comes from the C-701s, 
while their defensive power and staying power were one. 
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See Section 4. TG 480.4 for data pertaining to the 
development of this platform within H3 ANW. Due to their 
limited range, this TG operates close to shore, but 
provides a credible missile threat to FRIFOR despite the 
shorter range of the C-701s compared to the C-802s.  These 
platforms still manage to adequately cover the western 
entrance to the Strait of Hormuz. 
 
 
Figure 22.   Scenario Overview With Weapon Ranges and  
Sensors Displayed (Best Viewed in Color) 
 
C. MODEL EXECUTION  
In this section, the model execution and observations 
are explained. Inputs for this model are based upon the 
Strait of Hormuz scenario previously described and the 
specifications of the vessels detailed in Appendices A and 
B. 
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1. Scenario Geography 
Harpoon3 ANW’s Scenario Editor allows the model to be 
developed using the correct longitude and latitude to 
provide a visual representation of the Strait of Hormuz 
(see Figure 22). Various features of the Map Preferences 
provide a number of additional features.  Depth of water or 
elevation of land can be displayed, affecting what 
platforms can be effectively employed within a geographic 
location. Weather and Sea State are environmental factors 
that were developed into the scenario.  Unlike the Salvo 
Equations, which do not directly account for environmental 
factors, this model explicitly uses these to affect 
scenario execution.  Sea State forces some of the smaller 
platforms, not designed for operations in higher sea 
states, to be limited in their operations.  Weather in the 
form of fog or precipitation provides modifiers that affect 
the visual line-of-sight (LOS) of vessels, as well as how 
well radar and sonar operate. Depth of water effects how 
submarines can operate, and in this scenario, limits their 
depth of operation.  It is believed this is a contributing 
factor to how well the MH-60Rs are able to search for and 
destroy the OPFOR submarines. Additionally, the simulation 
clock keeps track of time of day, resulting in operations 
conducted in reduced visibility of darkness.  
The dynamics of real-world interactions within the 
model, environmental factors and geography affecting 
platform performance, provides great insight into 




combat operations. H3 ANW provides an excellent tool for 
experimenting and learning how these factors affect a 
mission’s outcome. 
2. Scenario Platforms 
The Database Editor, based upon Microsoft Access 
software, allows the designer to develop and use a number 
of platforms: including manned and unmanned aircraft, 
surface combatants, and submarines. Additionally, numerous 
instillations and facilities are provided for entering a 
known base or creating a new one when designing a scenario. 
Along with all of these platforms, there is a vast index of 
weapons available for each platform. H3 ANW provides 
detailed explanations for each platform and weapon, to 
include who originally designed it, which country has 
produced or modified it, and what countries throughout the 
world are known to use it.  
For this thesis, designing a new platform proved 
harder than expected.  Specifically, designing a platform 
that operates similar to an actual platform was difficult.  
The database is so extensive and requirements so specific 
that correct type and number of engines and appropriate 
grade of fuel must be specified. Batteries for the various 
submarine platforms varied in their power output and 
recharge rate. Weapon assignment to a platform is tightly 
controlled in regards to what platforms are capable of 
carrying a specific weapon. Although educational benefits 
regarding platform capabilities, both strengths and 
weaknesses, were achieved, this process is cumbersome and 
extremely time consuming.  
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The strength of H3 ANW’s Database Editor is that it is 
modular in design, can be augmented with new platforms and 
multiple databases are up to date by a number of outside 
sources. Along with these databases, hundreds of readymade 
scenarios are available for download and play. These 
scenarios are designed around current events ranging from 
engagements involving Maritime Interdiction Operations 
(MIO) in support of NATO resolutions to providing 
protection of trade routes and pirate interdiction.  
The platforms used in this thesis helped display the 
very real threat the United States Navy faces within 
strategic choke points and littorals.  The asymmetrical 
OPFOR threats present in the Strait of Hormuz were used to 
demonstrate what FRIFOR tactics provide the greatest 
probability for mission success.   
3. Scenario Engagements 
The engagements in this model focused on FRIFOR 
attempts to remove the threat posed by OPFOR assets within 
the Strait of Hormuz. (See Figure 22) It should also be 
noted that all engagements occurred without human 
interaction, but rather under guidelines developed for the 
artificial intelligence using a Weapons Free posture. As 
previously described FRIFOR platforms receive IW on what 
potential threats are posed within the littoral. Based upon 
this intelligence, FRIFOR tactics used two task forces to 
approach from both the West and East entrances to the 
Strait.   
TF01 approaches from the East and is designed to 
combat the expected submarine threat and any OPFOR surface 
combatants present. Upon model execution, the platforms 
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assigned to TF01 cruise into the submarine threat zone, 
where the Kilo and Yono submarines held the tactical 
advantage. In these cases, the OPFOR submarines remain 
undetected and launch torpedoes at FRIFOR vessels. LCS 
ships react quickly and use tactics to avoid total loss of 
force while returning fire. Steregushchiy frigates do not 
react as quickly; discussed further in the next section. 
Both platforms demonstrated marked improvements once a 
clearly defined ASW mission was designed for the TF.  
H3 ANW allows a user to build a mission focused on 
operations such as ASW, ASUW, Recon, etc. Once assigned a 
mission, the platform operates according to established 
tactics designed to counter the expected threat. 
Specifically for this model, as soon as TF01 was assigned 
to an ASW mission, the vessels stayed near the edge or 
completely outside of the defined submarine threat zone, 
and used airborne assets to hunt and prosecute OPFOR subs. 
The airborne assets consist of two MH-60R helicopters for 
LCS, and one KA-27 Helix helicopter for the Steregushchiy. 
TF01 also has to deal with the OPFOR surface threats 
in the form of Kaman FPBs and C-14 missile boats.  To 
combat this threat, one MH-60R from each LCS is assigned an 
ASUW mission with a weapons loadout of eight Hellfire 
missiles. The other MH-60R helicopter for each LCS platform 
is assigned to the previously mentioned ASW mission with a 
weapons loadout of two Mk-54 torpedoes. The KA-27 Helix is 
limited to carrying only torpedoes, and do not provide any 
benefit towards the ASUW mission other than sensor and 
visual identification of surface contacts. At this time, it  
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is not clear if this is a limitation of the platform 
itself, or simply a limitation of the way the platform has 
been designed in H3 ANW. 
TF02 approaches from the West and is designed to 
combat the expected threat of OPFOR surface combatants. 
Upon model execution, TF02 was assigned to a well-defined 
ASUW mission with the MH-60R helicopters armed with eight 
hellfire missiles each. Unlike with the ASW mission, the 
LCS actively prosecutes surface contacts, while using the 
airborne assets as the primary offensive weapon. Several 
runs involved the LCS closing OPFOR surface forces and 
engaging in direct fire against the Thondor and C-14 
vessels with 57 mm Mk 110 gun system.  
This model was designed with specific ASW and ASUW 
mission areas defined through the H3 ANW user interface.  
These zones overlapped based upon the geography and threat 
location. Both TFs used their airborne assets as primary 
weapons and as a result occasionally suffered the loss of a 
helicopter to gunfire from the Kaman or Thondor platforms. 
The number of FRIFOR surface combatants used was varied 
from one to five platforms in each TF. In all cases, once 
the mission specifics were clearly defined, all platforms 
adopted the tactic of standing off and using the 
helicopters to engage OPFOR assets. 
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Figure 23.   Harpoon3 ANW Database Editor 
 
4. Scenario Observed Problems 
In designing the model, several problems were 
encountered during development or model execution. First 
and foremost was the H3 ANW Database Editor.  The editor 
appeared better at modifying platforms as opposed to 
creating new ones. It is not intuitive how to develop new 
platforms, and in fact proved to be quite a challenge. The 
initial form for navigating platforms is easy to follow, 
but actual platform design data is not user friendly. (See 
Figure 23) Designing a vessel from scratch requires 
knowledge of specific platform characteristics including 




available, approximations were required with probability 
that the platform did not perform as specifically as the 
real-world vessel.  
In an effort to gain as much detail as possible, the 
model was designed using platforms from the H3 ANW 
Database. Any incomplete data was approximated based upon 
class characteristics of similar vessels. Steregushchiy 
frigate data was obtained from the Harpoon Users’ Database 
3 (HUD3) which is downloadable from the Advanced Gaming 
System’s Harpoon Users’ Database website. Importing 
complete data from one database to another proved 
unachievable; as a result not all of the platform specifics 
were transferred. Missing characteristics were entered into 
the H3 ANW Database by the author. Upon model execution, 
Steregushchiy did not perform as well as expected given the 
platform’s potential capabilities. It is surmised the 
designed platform is not as robust as is required to 
emulate the real-world asset accurately. Further design 
development may enhance its performance in future models. 
Problems caused by geography occurred upon initial 
execution of the model. The first scenario designs placed 
the FRIFOR assets just outside of the Strait of Hormuz, 
poised to enter and conduct operations.  Upon activation, 
the first event to occur was multiple C-802s launching at 
the FRIFOR platforms, whose Close-In-Weapons-Systems (CIWS) 
began to engage incoming missiles. Simulating a combat 
information center (CIC) atmosphere, staff messages 
concerning incoming vampires and pop-up targets filled the 
message screen. This first run resulted in the two FRIFOR 
platforms being destroyed within the first 30 seconds of 
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model execution.  FRIFOR units began further outside threat 
envelopes and were guided by specific mission criteria for 
all subsequent runs.  
Specific platforms problems were previously mentioned; 
however, it is possible some of these occurred due to the 
method of model execution. Both forces were designed with 
specific missions, to identify each other as hostile in a 
weapons free posture.  The model was executed with all 
units operating independent of guidance from a real-world 
user. As a result, some of the platforms did not operate as 
might be expected if an intelligent adversary were 
operating them. Submarines, which should have had a 
tactical advantage based upon stealth and superior passive 
sensors, did not press the advantage or engage when it 
appeared they should.  This may be due to some of the 
transparent calculations that occurred, but it is expected 
that an intelligent advisory would operate differently.  
Clearly, the primary FRIFOR asset, helicopters 
occasionally would identify a target through the use of 
deployed sonobuoys or other sensors, but would continue 
along their planned search pattern rather than prosecuting 
the contact. Additionally, helicopters would identify a 
surface contact as hostile and then fly within its weapons 
range, to be shot down. The primary cause for helicopter 
loss was fuel capacity. They would conduct their mission, 
reach Bingo fuel, and have to ditch the aircraft while in 
route back to their ship. Helicopters attempting to land on 
platforms other than their assigned ship were not observed. 
It is understood that in real-world operations this would 
help enhance the mission capability of the helicopters. 
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The last problem encountered in designing the model 
was in correctly implementing Victory Conditions (VC), the 
criteria or mission objectives to be met in order to 
achieve mission success. The Scenario Editor allows for 
several options, which must be defined for all forces 
involved in the engagement.  These victory conditions can 
be in the form of completing a transit with either no or a 
acceptable percentage of losses, protecting high-value 
assets throughout a transit, forces surviving for a period 
of time, or a number of other combinations.  For both 
FRIFOR and OPFOR, this model defined the VC as 100 percent 
destruction of the adversary’s platforms; 20 for OPFOR and 
varied numbers for FRIFOR. Initially defining the VC proved 
problematic. Attempts to specify the number and names of 
each OPFOR platform resulted in FRIFOR’s inability to 
obtain VC, despite having destroyed all of the OPFOR 
platforms.  It is unclear if this was an error on the part 
of the simulator or in the design specifics. Adjustments in 
defining the VC as a generic list of submarines and surface 
ships allowed the FRIFOR assets to meet the defined VC. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
This thesis is the applied efforts of conducting a 
comparative analysis of commercial off-the-shelf naval 
simulations and classic operations research models. The 
focus of comparison was on the use of the naval simulation 
software Harpoon 3 Advance Naval Warfare (ANW). This thesis 
attempted to use H3 ANW to emulate the research results 
obtained by Ozdemir (2009). It also attempted to gain 
insights into how this cost-effective simulator may be used 
to help today’s Surface Warriors understand the asymmetric 
threats they may be faced with when conducting naval 
operations within strategic choke points and the littorals 
around the world. 
1. Benefits of Off-the-shelf PC-based Simulators 
In an article titled, Time for the Navy to Get into 
the Game!, published in U.S. Naval Institute’s magazine 
Proceedings (April 2009), Captain Mark Woolley, USN, wrote 
about the benefits PC-games can provide to naval training. 
He states that PC-based simulators are not a replacement 
for actual drills and exercises or expensive land-based 
simulators, such as those for fire fighting, damage 
control, seamanship and navigation. Nor are they intended 
to replace current embedded on-board training systems, like 
those associated with combat and engineering systems. They 
do, however, provide several distinct advantages for 
training that have yet to be fully realized. 
 74
First, they can make more effective use of costly 
simulator time by ensuring students have the basics before 
using the simulator. PC-based games use scenarios to build 
competency and leadership skills, thereby improving the 
effectiveness of drills and exercises conducted in 
simulators or on board a ship. Second, they have the 
advantage of providing realistic training for specific 
equipment, consoles, and platforms. They provide an 
opportunity to refresh skills on a periodic basis, 
especially when the land-based simulators are not available 
or it is not possible to bring up shipboard systems or take 
systems off-line for dedicated training (e.g., shipyard or 
underway operations). Last, they provide a learning 
platform that is more appealing to the majority of younger 
generations than other forms of media. They offer an 
additional forum for Sailors to learn and increase their 
professional expertise. Furthermore, with the proliferation 
of personal laptop computers, they permit Sailors in cases 
where the material is unclassified to learn at their own 
pace outside the normal training lifelines. 
2. Harpoon 3 Advanced Naval Warfare  
This thesis used the Harpoon3 ANW simulation software 
to recreate the model used by Ozdemir (2009) which 
conducted research using Modified Hughes’ Salvo Equations.  
While a dynamic and highly detailed simulation, a direct 
comparison of results was not obtained. This is attributed 
to several factors, the first being the different 
approaches used by the tools. 
Salvo Equations assign specific homogeneous values for 
Striking, Defensive, and Staying Powers, as well as 
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Scouting, Readiness, Training and even Leaker rates (See 
Chapter II for more detailed explanations) to scenario 
specific heterogeneous Opposition Forces (OPFOR) and 
Friendly Forces (FRIFOR). H3 ANW uses an intricate series 
of tabulated formulas, reference tables, and modifiers to 
model dynamic interaction between forces. The Salvo 
Equations model is able to isolate successive waves of 
OPFOR assets, assigning specific values to each and 
allowing FRIFOR assets to rearm and refuel between each 
engagement. The H3 ANW model produces a dynamic interaction 
that has OPFOR patrol areas and weapons ranges overlapping. 
It also allows for FRIFOR platforms to use specific tactics 
when engaging OPFRO threats.  The use of dedicated anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-surface warfare (ASUW) 
patrols and tactics marked a profound difference in the 
outcome of each model run.  Whereas the Salvo Equation 
model provided insights through the use of mathematical 
calculations, and was instrumental in defining the scenario 
for this thesis, H3 ANW provided insights into specific 
platforms capabilities and limitations, employed tactics, 
environmental factors, and geographic concerns when 
conducting operations within strategic choke points and  
littorals around the world. 
3. Harpoon 3 Professional 
Harpoon 3 Professional (H3Pro) is another development 
of the Harpoon 3 game engine, which has extensive changes 
incorporated for use by the defense industry. It will not 
be available to the general public and will be published by 
Advanced Gaming System Inc. (AGSI) H3Pro features 
enhancements requested by AGSI’s military customers. The 
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most popular application is to extend modeling and 
simulation capabilities already in place. Existing 
simulation software tends to be precise and requires a 
commensurate level of staffing for effective use. When an 
analyst needs to take a broad look at a problem and run 
many scenarios, the “heavy” tools take too long and do not 
allow for adequate coverage. H3Pro runs at a lower 
fidelity, thus faster, and with a much smaller footprint. 
This means an analyst can survey a problem space quickly 
and easily, and then bring the “heavy” tools to bear on a 
better-defined problem (Computerharpoon.com/wiki). 
H3Pro embodies the latest in naval warfare simulations 
for analysis, education and training. Among the new 
features are programmable mission behaviors, a new mission 
type allowing for boarding of ships by helicopter, thereby 
simulating special operations. Users may then simulate 
situations taken from today’s headlines, such as fighting 
Somali pirates or interdicting drug runners who use 
submersibles.  Customization is available, and both the 
databases and scenarios are open for end-user editing. AGSI 
states that they have former defense experts available to 
assist in training, configuration, design and execution. 
Some of the improvements touted by AGSI include: 
1. Geospatial Information Systems (GIS) Interface: 
Allows simple geometric shapes to be imported 
from products such as ESRI's ArcInfo 
2.  Harpoon Track Interface (HTI): Unit tracks can 
be exported to a standard database product and 
then to products such as Satellite Tool Kit (STK) 
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3. “Hot Wash-up” or “VCR”: Provides the ability for 
entire games to be recorded, viewed, edited and 
replayed 
4. Structured Query Language (SQL) 
5. Distributed Interactive Simulation (DIS) 
Interface: International standard used for 
simulations to communicate in real time 
6. Umpire functionality providing the ability for a 




Junior officers in the United States Navy Surface 
Fleet are taught the basics of naval warfare, 
communications, and tactics. It is not until later in the 
leadership pipeline that they are exposed to specific 
tactics and methods for combating the threats faced by 
naval professionals.  Taught to regurgitate specific 
details while earning the Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) 
qualification pin, many officers never have the opportunity 
to learn what those platforms can do, how they are 
employed, and what potential threats they are susceptible 
to. Unfortunately, there are those platforms such as the 
USS VINCENNES, USS STARK, and USS COLE who know all too 
well the harsh lessons learned from real-world operations.  
For junior officers, all of their training and 
studying culminates in book knowledge presented before a 
unit’s SWO qualification board.  What value and insights 
could be gained by allowing Surface Warriors to participate 
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in training through the use of simulated scenarios?  How 
much more professional and alert would a vessel’s 
leadership be after having conducted an operation where 
they watched their ship overwhelmed by small missile boats 
while conducting a transit though a strategic choke point? 
The benefits of allowing a ship’s wardroom to actually 
participate in and see the threats they may face would be 
an eye-opening experience for many, while helping to 
sharpen warfighting skills.  
The Harpoon3 ANW/Pro series of naval simulations 
provides an inexpensive aggregated training tool that can 
benefit today’s United States Navy. It provides scenario 
based training that can be tailored to operations within 
specific geographical locations, demonstrate upcoming 
ship’s evolutions, or educate leadership on scenarios right 
out of the headlines (e.g., Somali pirate interaction).  
The potential as a cost effective training tool to 
introduce Surface Warriors to the asymmetric threats they 
face today has yet to be realized.  
C. FUTURE STUDY 
The original intention of providing an analytical 
comparison between results gained from a model using 
Hughes’ Salvo Equations and the output of a similar 
scenario using the off-the-shelf naval simulation software 
Harpoon 3 Advanced Naval Warfare (H3 ANW) was not realized. 
Instead, what was gained is a better understanding of the 
mathematical nature of Hughes’ Salvo Equation models and 
the dynamic interaction of an intelligent software tool 
such as H3 ANW. The insights and education that was gained 
in regards to platform capabilities, weapons employment, 
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and mission specific tactics was a direct result of 
experimentation while designing and executing a real-world 
scenario. (See Figure 24.) 
Future analysis can include enhancing the scenario by 
further refining the available platforms, adding threats 
such as shore-based C-802s, incorporating fixed-wing 
aircraft, and developing platforms that demonstrate the 
capabilities of semi-submersible boats used by Iran. 
Additionally, a comparison of results between scenarios 
developed for Harpoon3 ANW/Pro with similar scenarios 
executed using agent-based distillation models with the aim 
of verifying or challenging the results obtained by 
Harpoon3 ANW/Pro simulation software. Finally, assessment 
of a multi-player feature of H3 ANW can be conducted. 
Scenarios involving multiple user interfaces may provide 
greater insight into the potential use as a training tool, 
and avoid scenario situations involving AI dogma. The added 
complexities of a human-in-the-loop opponent will most 
certainly add to the overall robustness of the model.  
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Figure 24.   Strait of Hormuz Tactical Picture at Height of 




APPENDIX A.  FRIENDLY FORCE ASSETS 
A. FREEDOM CLASS LCS FLIGHT 0 
USS Freedom (LCS-1), built by Lockheed Martin in 
Marinette Marine, Wisconsin, was commissioned on 8 November 
2008. USS Forth Worth (LCS-3) is due to be commissioned in 
2013. A total of 55 LCSs is proposed. 
 
Displacement 3089 tons, full load 
Dimensions 115.3 m x 13.1 m x 3.9 m (Length, Beam, 
Draft) 
Main Machinery CODAG; 2 GT (96550 hp), 2 Diesels (17160 
hp), 4 Water jets 
Speed, Range 45 Kts, 3500 NM at 18 Kts  
Complement 50+25 mission package crew and aircrew 
Missiles 1 RAM RIM-116, 21-cell Mk 99 launcher, 
Passive IR/anti-radiation homing to 5.2 NM 
at 2.5 Mach, Warhead 9.1 kg, 
Guns 1 57 mm/70 Mk 2, 220 rds/min to 9 NM, shell 
weight 2.4 kg, 4 12.7 mm MG 
Countermeasures 2 SKWS/SRBOC decoy launcher, ESM/ECM 
Helicopters 2 MH-60 R/S Helicopter or 1 MH-60 R/S and 3 
MQ-8B Fire Scout VTUAVs 
Notes 7 Mission Modules (3 MW, 2 ASW, and 2 ASUW) 
are to be used interchangeable on LCS. 
Capability to launch and recover manned and 
unmanned boats. 
Table 10.   Freedom Class LCS Characteristics 
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Figure 25.   USS Freedom-1 (LCS-1), from JFS 
 
Figure 26.   USS Freedom-2 (LCS-1), from JFS 
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B. STEREGUSHCHIY CLASS (PROJECT 20380) FRIGATE (FFGH) 
RS Steregushchiy (F-530), built at Severnaya, St. 
Petersburg for the Russian Navy, was commissioned on 14 
November 2007. Four more of this design are being built and 
will be commissioned between 2010 and 2011. Two more are 
proposed. 
 
Displacement 2200 tons, full load 
Dimensions 104.5 m x 11.1 m x 3.7 m (Length, Beam, 
Draft) 
Main Machinery CODAD; 4 Diesels (24000 hp), 2 shafts 
Speed, Range 26 Kts, 3500 NM at 14 Kts  
Complement 100 
Missiles 1 CADS-N-1 Kashtan, twin 30 mm Gatling 
combined with 8 SA-N-11 Grisson, laser beam 
guidance to 4.4 NM, warhead 9 kg, 9000 
rds/min for guns 
Guns 1 100 mm, 80 rds/min to 11.6 NM, shell 
weight 15.6 kg, 2 30 mm/65 AK 630 CIWS, 
3000 rds/min, 2 14.5 mm MG 
Torpedoes 8 324 mm tubes, anti-torpedo active/passive 
homing to 2.7 NM, warhead 70 kg 
Countermeasures 4 PK 1- launchers, ESM/ECM 
Helicopters 1 Ka-27 Helix 
Notes Space is provided for 8 SS-N-25 SSMs 
Table 11.   Steregushchiy Class Frigate Characteristics 
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Figure 27.   RS Steregushchiy-1 (F-530), from JFS 
 
Figure 28.   RS Steregushchiy-2 (F-530), from JFS 
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C. SIKORSKY MH-60R SEAHAWK 
MH-60R Seahawk is built for the U.S. Navy to replace 
the aging SH-60B/F fleet. It will serve as the future 
tactical helicopter operated from surface combatants. 
Entered in the frontline service in 2006, MH-60R is 
equipped with a full-spectrum of airborne sensor suits, 
equipments and weapons for principal naval warfare. Recent 
product improvements to the helicopter include a fourth 
weapons station, allowing a total of eight AGM-114 Hellfire 
missiles or four Mk-54 torpedoes. Besides the modern 
sensors  and lethal weapons load, having an operational 
speed of 145 knots and a range of 450 NM, MH-60R Seahawk is 
one of the most effective tactical helicopters operated 
from ships.  
 
Figure 29.   MH-60R Seahawk, from JFS 
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APPENDIX B.  OPPOSING FORCE ASSETS 
A. KILO CLASS (PROJECT 877 EKM) SUBMARINE (SSK) 
Three Kilo class submarines were built for the Iranian 
Navy by the Admiralty Yard in Saint Petersburg and 
commissioned in 1992, 1993 and 1996.  
 
Displacement 3076 tons dived 
Dimensions 72.6 m x 9.9 m x 6.6 m (Length, Beam, Draft) 
Main Machinery 2 Diesels (3650 hp), 1 electric motor (5500 hp), 
1 shaft 
Speed, Range 17 Kts dived, 6000 NM at 7 Kts snorting  
Complement 53 
Torpedoes 6 533 mm tubes, combination of TEST-71/96 wire 
guided active/passive homing to 8.1 NM at 40 Kts, 
warhead 220 kg and 53-65 passive wake homing to 
10.3 NM at 45 Kts, warhead 350 kg. Total of 18 
torpedoes. 24 mines in lieu of torpedoes. 
Notes Chinese YJ-1 or Russian Novator Alfa SSMs and SA-
N-10 SAMs may be fitted during the planned 
upgrade refit of the boats. 




Figure 30.   Iranian Kilo Class Submarine-1, from JFS 
 
Figure 31.   Iranian Kilo Class Submarine-2, from JFS 
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B. YONO CLASS (IS 120) COASTAL SUBMARINE (SSC) 
Based on the North Korean design, a total of five 
submarines are claimed to have been built in Iran with one 
more under construction. First noticed in 2004, little is 
known about these boats.  
 
Displacement 123 tons dived 
Dimensions 29 m x 2.8 m x 2.5 m (Length, Beam, Draft) 
Main Machinery Diesel-electric 
Complement 32 
Torpedoes 2 533 mm tubes 
Table 13.   Yono Class Submarine Characteristics 
 
 
Figure 32.   Iranian Yono Class Submarine, from JFS 
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C. KAMAN (COMBATTANTE II) CLASS FPB (PGFG) 
Ten boats were built by CMN in Cherbourg, France for 
the Iranian Navy and commissioned between 1977 and 1981. 
Three more of this class were built by Iran at Bandar 
Anzali on the Caspian coast and commissioned in 2004, 2006 
and 2008.  
 
Displacement 275 tons full load 
Dimensions 47 m x 7.1 m x 1.9 m (Length, Beam, Draft) 
Main 
Machinery 
4 Diesels (12280 hp), 4 shafts 
Speed, Range 38 Kts, 2000 NM at 15 Kts  
Complement 31 
Missiles 2 or 4 C-802, active radar homing to 66 NM 
at 0.9 Mach, warhead 165 kg 
Guns 1 76 mm/62, 85 rds/min to 8.7 NM, shell 
weight 6 kg, 1 40 mm/70, 300 rds/min to 6.6 
NM. Some have 23 m or 20 mm gun in place of 
40 mm. 2 12.7 mm MG 
Notes SA-7 portable SAMs maybe embarked. Latter 
built boats are stationed in Caspian Sea. 




Figure 33.   Iranian Kaman Class FPB-1, from JFS 
 
 
Figure 34.   Iranian Kaman Class FPB-2, from JFS 
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D. THONDOR (HOUDONG) CLASS FPB (PGFG) 
Ten boats were built for the Iranian Navy at Zhanjiang 
Shipyard, China and commissioned in two batches in 1994 and 
1996.  
 
Displacement 205 tons full load 
Dimensions 38.6 m x 6.8 m x 2.7 m (Length, Beam, Draft) 
Main 
Machinery 
3 Diesels (8025 hp), 3 shafts 
Speed, Range 35 Kts, 800 NM at 30 Kts  
Complement 28 
Missiles 4 C-802, active radar homing to 66 NM at 0.9 
Mach, warhead 165 kg 
Guns 2 30 mm AK 230, 2 23 mm MG 
Notes A similar design to Chinese Huangfen (Osa 1) 
Table 15.   Thondor Class FPB Characteristics 
 
 
Figure 35.   Iranian Thondor Class FPB, from JFS 
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E. C-14 CLASS MISSILE BOAT (PTG) 
Nine boats were built by China State Shipbuilding 
Corporation and delivered starting in 2000. Five boats are 
likely to carry short range Chinese FL-10 SSMs, while the 
remaining four have a Multiple Rocket Launcher (MRL). 
 
Displacement 17 tons 
Dimensions 13.7 m x 4.8 m x 0.7 m (Length, Beam, 
Draft) 
Main Machinery 2 Diesels (2300 hp), 2 shafts 
Speed 50 Kts  
Missiles 4 FL-10 
Guns 1 20 mm, 1 12.7 mm MG 
Notes A catamaran-hull design 
Table 16.   C-14 Class Boat Characteristics 
 
 
Figure 36.   Iranian C-14 Class Missile Boat, from JFS 
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